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Executive Summary 
O ne of the most important engines driving global economic development and progress in recent years is the freedom to engage in seaborne trade 
throughout the world. Relatively unhindered access to the world's ports is a vitally 
important component of the recent story of global economic success. At the same 
time. the grave threats that internat ional terrorists and rogue States pose to global 
order give rise to overriding maritime security concerns among port States, factors 
which argue strongly against a maritime open-door policy. Other vital concerns, 
including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, unsafe oil tankers, illegal fishing 
and other threats to the marine environment, and violation of customs and trade 
laws, are also prompting port States to take actions that im pose conditions on port 
entry, to exercise greater jurisdiction in port and even to restr ict traditional free-
doms of navigation in coastal waters. 
As a general rule, international law preswnes that the ports of every State should 
be open to all commercial vessels. However, if a State considers that one or more 
important interests require closure, necessitate imposing conditions on entry or 
exit, or dictate the exercise of greater jurisdiction over fo reign vessels in port, 
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international law generally pennits the port State to do so. A port State may restrict 
the port entry of all foreign vessels, subject only to any rights of entry clearly 
granted under an applicable treaty and those vessels in distress due to force majeure. 
At the same time, international law presumes that the port State will restrict access 
to foreign commercial vessels or impose sanctions upon those that enter port, even 
those designed to promote important maritime goals, which are reasonably related 
to ensuring the safe, secure and appropriate entry or departure of the vessel on the 
occasion in question. 
As a fundamental policy goal, all States must cooperate to develop and imple-
ment efficient and effective conditions on port entry to ensure the security of the 
port State and the international commercial system. Unreasonably restrictive con-
ditions would have a deleterious effect on global trade and the world's economy. 
Ineffective conditions on entry, such as faulty procedures to screen ships and their 
cargoes, could result in a security breakdown and a devastating terrorist attack on a 
port city. Such a disaster would render virtually inconsequential the debate over re-
strictions on port entry to achieve political, environmental, navigational safety, law 
enforcement or other worthwhile goals. Even so, international lawyers and policy-
makers in the United States and elsewhere m ust seek to ensure that access to the 
ports of the world is fundamentally free, and restricted only on conditions directly, 
effectively and reasonably related to the significant interests of the port State and 
the world community at large. 
This article discusses general principles of international and domestic law gov-
erning the condition of port entry as a basis for regulating foreign vessels entering 
ports, with an emphasis on maritime security. It also considers the policy conse-
quences of imposing legally permissible restrictions or requirements that could 
have the practical effect of infringing unreasonably on maritime commerce, or 
which would lead to concerns in the international community and which might re-
sult in diplomatic protests and political objections. The goal of the article is to de-
velop an analytical structure that would encourage a rational review of any 
proposed conditions on entry to ports to help ensure that any such requirements 
are legal, acceptable, reasonable and wise. In a post-9f t ! world that remains de-
pendent on international trade for economic prosperity, achieving an effective, 
balanced, legal and workable port-entry regime is a vi tally important goal. 
1. Introduction and Competing Policy Interests 
As a general rule, international law presumes that the ports of every State should be 
open to all commercial vessels seeking to call on them. As Professors McDougal 
and Burke observed forty-five years ago: "The chieffunction of ports for the coastal 
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state is in provision of cheap and easy access to the oceans and to the rest of the 
world .... [T]he availability of good harbors ... remains a priceless national asset."1 
Every modern State has a general obligation to engage in commercial intercourse 
with other States and, absent an important reason, none should deny foreign com-
mercial vessels reciprocal access to its ports.2 
In a much-quoted (yet often-criticized) statement, an arbitral tribunal observed 
in the Aramco case in 1958, "According to a great principle of public international 
law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only 
be dosed when the vital interests of the State so require.») In his widely respected 
treatise, Dr. c.J. Colombos wrote that "in time of peace, commercial ports must be 
left open to international traffic," and that the "liberty of access to ports granted to 
foreign vessels implies their right to load and unload their cargoes; embark and dis-
embark their passengers."4 The Third Restatement of the Foreign ReiatimlS Law of 
the United States swnmarizes the legal principle as follows: " In general, maritime 
ports are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity, . . . but the coastal State 
may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative reasons . ... "5 
At the same time, each port State has the sovereign right to deny entry and to es-
tablish reasonable conditions related to access to its internal waters, harbors, 
roadsteads and ports.6 Indeed, apart from certain pronouncements, there is little 
actual support for the broad statement that ports can only be closed for "vital inter-
ests" or "imperative reasons" as a fundamental principle of customary interna-
tional law.1 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (1982 LOS 
Convention)8 "contains no restriction on the right of a state to establish port entry 
requirements .... "9 Article 25, entitled "Rights of protection of the coastal State," 
provides: "In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facil-
ity outside internal waters, the coastal State ... has the right to take the necessary 
steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to 
internal waters or such a call is subject."10 While the United States signed the "Part XI 
Agreement," which incorporates almost all of the 1982 LOS Conventions in 1994, 
the United States Senate has not yet ratified or acceded to it. Even so, the United 
States has long considered the navigation-related principles contained in the 1982 
LOS Convention to reflect customary international law, binding on all States. II 
After carefully examining the relevant authorities cited in support of such a 
right-of-port-entry principle in the Aramco case, Professor A. V. Lowe concluded 
that international law does not so severely restrict the authority of a port State to 
close a port or impose conditions on entry.12 He convincingly distinguished be-
tween a right of entry and a presllmption of entry, concluding that " the ports of a 
State which are designated for international trade are, in the absence of express 
provisions to the contrary made by a port State, presumed to be open to the 
35 
Conditions on Entry of Foreign-Flag Vessels into US Ports 
merchant ships of all States .... [S]uch ports should not be closed to foreign mer-
chant ships except when the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State ne-
cessitatesclosure."1 3 Another knowledgeable observer went even further: "There is 
a presumption that all ports used for international trade are open to all merchant 
vessels, but this is practice only, based upon convenience and commercial interest; 
it is not a legal obligation .... Pursuant to [their sovereignty over their internal wa-
ters], states have absolute control over access to their portS."14 The United States 
Supreme Court observed that the internal waters and territorial sea are "subject to 
the complete sovereignty of the nation, as much as if they were a part of its land ter-
ritory, and the coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude foreign vessels alto-
gether."15 In another case, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had "the 
power ... to condition access to our ports by foreign-owned vessels upon submis-
sion to any liabilities it may consider good American policy to exact."16 
Whether States view port entry as an international obligation or one granted 
based on international comity and domestic self-interest, they typically do not un-
dertake to deny entry to their ports without good cause. Before restricting entry to its 
ports, a State must have good policy reasons to do so. "Vital interests," "imperative 
reasons" or what factors may "necessitat [e[ closure" or constitute "good policy" in-
clude such obvious ones as national security or public health. However, acceptable 
State practice includes closing a port to enforce an embargo, to sanction hostile be-
havior by another State, to impose a political reprisal l7 or to promote other signifi-
cant interests as the port State may determine to be appropriate and necessary.18 
There is a good deal of foreign State practice supporting the imposition of a 
broad spectrum of conditions governing port entry and the exercise of jurisdiction 
in port.19 Today, there is general agreement " that the coastal state has full authority 
over access to ports and is competent to exercise it, virtually at will, to exclude entry 
by foreign vesse1s."2(1 Among appropriate entry conditions are complying with pi-
lotage requirements, obeying traffic separation schemes and paying customs duties. 
Port States have even greater rights to limit or control entry with respect to certain 
categories of vessels, such as warships, nuclear-powered vessels, fishing boats and 
recreational craft. Absent agreement between the States concerned, foreign war-
ships have no general expectation ofbeingpermittedentry 21 and must request per-
mission to make a port call in each casc.22 International law also permits port States 
to deny or condition entry as they see fit to foreign-flag fishing boats2.1 and private 
recreational craft.2A Some port States may consider that the domestic political costs 
of approving nuclear-powered or -armed vessels entry to their waters are too 
high,25 while granting port entry to warships, fishing vessels and private recre-
ational craft does not promote the overriding interests of the port State in interna-
tional trade that foreign- flag commercial vessels directly serve. 
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Just as there is a presumption that a port State may not properly bar a foreign 
commercial vessel from entry into its ports absent adequate justification, the af-
fected flag State and the international community would view with concern the 
imposition of unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory requirements for access.26 
" It is .. . possible that closures or conditions of entry which are patently unreason-
able or discriminatory might be held to amount to an abus de droit, for which the 
coastal State might be internationally responsible even if there was no right of entry 
to the port."27 However, both conventional and customary international law per-
mit a State to impose reasonable restrictions on port entry.28 The possible condi-
tions on entry run from those historically designed to ensure that vessel and crew 
are free from infectious diseases, and that customs duties have or will be paid, to 
provisions ensuring that promises to use the services of a pilot when entering or exiting 
port, and to moor or anchor as directed, are kept. These also include those security-
related concerns so important in a post-9f!! world, such as submission of passen-
ger and crew lists and cargo manifests, and a willingness to wait beyond the limits 
of the territorial sea until an inspection of the vessel with radiation monitoring 
equipment can be completed.29 
Of course, under the fundamen tal international legal principle of pacta SUflt 
servaflda, nation-States must comply with international agreements to which they 
are party. Hundreds of bilateral fr iendship, commerce and navigation (FeN) trea-
ties govern the circumstances under which those party to the agreements permit 
port entry to the other.30 Such FeN treaties confirm the general presumption that 
ports will be open and unrestricted by unreasonable conditions. Whether these bi-
lateral FeN or "most-favored-nation" treaties concerning commerce and naviga-
tion reflect customary international law or may have helped established a rule of 
customary law, there is a general expectancy that, when entered into, commercial 
vessels of either party will be able to trade with any foreign port, and will need to 
comply only with standard and necessary port ent ry conditions and expectations.31 
Here again, international practice is to exclude warships and fishing vessels from 
the general presumption of entry.32 Whether at sea or in port, warships and other 
sovereign immune vessels are subject only to the enforcement jurisdiction of the 
flag State.33 If a sovereign immune vessel engages in an activity in violation of the 
law of the port State, local authorities may direct that the vessel leave immediately 
and may seek damages through diplomatic channels resulting from the actions of 
foreign sovereign immune vessels.:l4 
Although a port State has a right to condition entry to its ports based on a broad 
spectrum of concerns, any such restrictions entail costs. The costs include those di-
rectly involved in administering the conditions, from processing the paperwork to 
conducting any ship inspections that may be necessary. Such direct costs may be 
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fully or partially offset with appropriate port-entry, pilotage, mooring or anchor-
age fees. But the most significant burden entails the economic, political and other 
costs involved in slowing, complicating or otherwise interfering with the smooth 
and efficient flow of international trade. Whether a nation's port-entry scheme re-
quires a merchant vessel to wait outside port until it receives clearance, embarks a 
pilot or agrees to submit to a search, or imposes such an extensive planning, in-
spection or reporting system on shipping companies or ship masters that it is no 
longer attractive to do business with a certain nation or port, any such conditions 
on port en try make international trade more time-consuming, difficult and costly. 
The 1965 Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic, modeled 
on earlier international efforts to improve international air traffic, emphasizes the 
importance of simplifying and reducing to a minimum the administrative burdens 
imposed on international shipping "to fac ilitate and expedite international mari-
time traffic .... "35 International legal principles also expect that port States will ex-
tend "equality of treatment" to prohibit discrimination in all rules governing port 
entry and conditions and procedures applied to foreign commercial vessels.36 
Given the crucial importance of international trade in today's global economy, 
the cumulative impact of incremental costs, short delays or minor disruptions can 
have a profoundly adverse impact. In this regard, harmonizing and coordinating 
conditions on port entry throughout the world community, with similar expecta-
tions, requirements, forms and procedures, can achieve the desired goals without 
imposing as much of an administrative burden. Wisely balancing the benefits to be 
achieved from imposing conditions on port entry, such as intelligently devised se-
curityrequirements, against the costs and burdens associated with each is essential. 
As one commentator obselVed, with respect to the broader efforts to protect the 
nation's securi ty against potential terrorist attacks, "Ultimately, getting homeland 
security right is not about constructing barricades to fend off terrorists. It is, or 
should be, about identifying and taking the steps necessary to allow the United 
States to remain an open, prosperous, free, and globally engaged society."37 Pro-
moting relatively unrestricted oceangoing trade is essential to the continued eco-
nomic vitality of the world. As Dr. ' ames Carafano, senior fellow fo r National 
Security and Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation, obSClVed: "Global 
commerce is the single greatest engine in economic growth and it's the single most 
important thing that raises the standard of living for every human being on the 
planet."38 The goal of policymakers and the attorneys and other subject-matter ex-
perts who advise them must be to find an appropriate balance that fos ters effective 
and workable limitations on port entrydirect1y related to promoting the important 
goals to be achieved, while avoiding unnecessarily burdensome restrictions and 
procedures that merely hamper free international navigation and trade. 
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11. Historical Background, Contemporary Context and Analytic.al Structure 
A. Historical Background 
Seaborne commerce has been a vitally important part of the world's economy ever 
since mankind began to engage in substantial trade with his neighbor. Portuguese, 
Chinese, Arabian, Indian, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and English ships competed with 
each other over the centuries to dominate key trade routes and control the supply 
of commodities and other valuable goods. Global maritime trade has been a vital 
component in stimulating international relationships and economic growth. In-
deed, perhaps the most impressive structural development in the history of world 
growth and development has been oceangoing trade. Particularly for goods carried 
in quantity or bulk, water transportation has long been cheaper and more efficient 
and-until the advent of railways, modern highways and trucks, and airplanes-
usually a good deal fas ter than the alternative transportation modalities. 
At the same time, history has demonstrated the risks associated with maritime 
activities. Too often, the crews of seagoing vessels were engaged in activities less be-
nign than mutually beneficial, arm's-length trading. Pirates and privateers 
wreaked havoc on ships engaged in peaceful trade. Coastal raiders, such as the Hit-
tites in the twelfth century BC, and Vikings around the tenth century AD, ravaged 
shipping, ports and peoples. Vicious oceangoing criminals have preyed on those 
weaker than themselves along the coasts of Africa and Southeast Asia for thousands 
of years. Powerful maritime States engaged in the conquest of foreign lands and 
monopolization of vital shipping lanes and key trading ports and nations. From 
seaborne attacks against ports in the Mediterranean to the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor, States have sought to exploit coastal waters to wage aggressive warfare. 
History has demonstrated that the tremendous benefits of international ocean 
commerce must be balanced against the potential risks. Even so, while the history 
of international ocean trade no doubt has demonstrated the potential for adverse 
activities and consequences, including imperialism, colonization, conflict, piracy 
and maritime terrorism, seaborne commerce has long been a vital component in 
promoting global economic growth and improving living conditions worldwide. :W 
B. Contemporary Context 
Nothing in history rivals the scale on which the world community trades by sea to-
day. Moreover, world trade has been growing at 6-10 percent each year.40 Ocean 
commerce will no doubt become increasingly vital in years to come. Some 9S per-
cent of the world's trade today is dependent on maritime commerce. Ifit were not 
for ocean transport of key commodities, such as oil and natural gas, cereal grains, 
such as wheat and rice, and construction materials, many of the world's peoples 
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would not have power for their transportation and electrical systems, food for their 
tables or homes for their families. Increasingly, international trade has focused on 
high-value items, such as automobiles, televisions, furniture and expensive enter-
tainment systems. Specially constructed roll-on, roll-off vehicle carriers and con-
tainer ships carrying thousands of interchangeable sealed containers transport 
cargoes worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Often, the value of the cargo far ex-
ceeds the value of the ship. The nations of Asia, in particular Japan, South Korea, 
Thailand, Singapore, India and, increasingly, China (via modern port facilities in 
Hong Kong and, increasingly, on the mainland), dominate high-value ocean 
trade.41 These States use a good portion of the profits from this trade to purchase 
oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Middle East, Indonesian archipelago, and 
parts of western Africa. Supertankers transport huge amounts of oil and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) tankers carry tremendous volumes of natural gas through re-
stricted waters of southeastern Asia to the vibrant, but energy-dependent, econo-
mies of North and South America, Europe, and South and East Asia. 
Despite the tremendous worldwide economic growth exemplified by China, In-
dia, Brazil and several other developing States, the American economy remains, by 
far, the largest and most dynamic in the world. It would be difficult to exaggerate 
the importance of the maritime transportation component to this nation's econ-
omy. When measured by volume, more than 95 percent of international trade that 
enters or leaves this country does so through the nation's ports and inland water-
ways.42 In 2004, US ports handled almost twenty million multimodal shipping 
containers.43 Container ships, which account for only eleven percent of the annual 
tonnage of waterborne overseas trade, account for two-thirds of the value of that 
trade. Several of the 326 or so seagoing ports in the United States, including Los 
Angeles/Long Beach, New York, Houston, San Francisco and Baltimore, are 
among the busiest in the world in one or more categories.44 In excess of two billion 
tons of domestic and international commerce now are carried on the water, creat-
ing more than thirteen million jobs and contributing more than $742 billion to the 
gross national product.4S Multimodal freight transportation accounts for nearly 15 
percent of services the United States trades internationally. Each year, some 7,500 
vessels fl ying foreign flags make 51,000 calls in US ports.46 
Energy is also a critical and growing import into the United States. Large Ameri-
can owned andJor operated tankers carry oil from Valdez, Alaska to terminals 
and refineries on the West Coast. But a much larger volwne of oil is imported into 
ports on the Gulf Coast fro m Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria and the Middle East.47 
Increasingly, huge liquefied natural gas tankers call on US terminals to meet the 
tremendous and increasing American appetite for natural gas.48 Presently, there 
are only six LNG terminals in the United States, but there are plans under way to 
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build dozens more.49 Because the volume of international trade is expected to double 
by 2020, and because the maritime transportation system is the nation's best means 
of accommodating that growth, experts expect that the importance of seaports in the 
US economy will continue to grow dramatically over the coming years. 50 
While trade has grown dramatically, the potential national security risks are also 
far greater and more complex today than they have ever been in the past. To illus-
trate, in December, 1941, the Empire of Japan assembled a fleet consisting of six 
aircraft carriers, thousands of men, hundreds of aircraft and scores of supporting 
vessels (including submarines and mini-subs) to attack the US Navy and Army in-
frastructure at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This surprise attack killed some 2,403 service 
members and sixty-eight civilians, seriously damaged or destroyed twelve warships 
and 188 aircraft, caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to infrastruc-
ture, and plunged the United States into the Second World War.51 Nearly sixty 
years later, a mere fifteen Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four civilian airliners and 
caused the death of nearly three thousand innocent civilians and wreaked incalcu-
lable financial costs by intentionally crashing three of the aircraft into the World 
Trade Center towers and Pentagon. As a result, the United States is now engaged in 
a "global war on terrorism" (GWOT), with hundreds of thousands of casualties 
and hundreds of billions of dollars in costsY 
Even this level of death and destruction would pale compared to the potential 
numbers of casualties, and the hundreds of billions of dollars in potential destruc-
tion and disruption of global trade, were a nuclear device, "dirty bomb" or other 
weapon of mass destruction to explode in a major port city, such as Long Beach or 
Baltimore.53 Experts fear that terrorists could hide such a device in one of the many 
thousands of ubiquitous shipping containers imported into the United States every 
day.54 Other scenarios, such as the possibility that terrorists would hijack an LNG 
carrier and detonate the cargo in a populated or industrial area, could also result in 
devastating destruction.55 Assuming a rational and effective connection between 
restrictions on port entry and efforts to prevent such a disaster, a port State could 
condition port entry on compliance with virtually any set of maritime security 
measures consistent with international law. Likewise, port States could exert juris-
diction over fore ign-flag vessels voluntarily in port, other than sovereign immune 
vessels, to carry out virtually any rational and effective security measure. 
On the other hand, policy experts would argue that handcuffmg international 
trade with irrational, excessive and ineffective restrictions would be counterpro-
ductive--enormously disruptive, hugely expensive and fundamentally unwise.56 
Moreover, if the United States were to adopt a policy to conduct wide-ranging, in-
trusive security raids on board foreign-flag vessels voluntarily present in US ports, 
such heavy-handed tactics would likely prompt international censure and, to some 
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extent, discourage trade. For national concerns of somewhat lesser magnitude, 
such as to prevent customs violations or the importation of illegal drugs, the impo-
sition of intrusive pre-entry requirements, while legal, should also be directly and 
reasonably related to the goals to be accomplished. 
C. Analytical Structure 
In evaluating the legal principles governing the right of port States to impose condi-
tions on port entry to promote maritime security, this article will consider various 
facto rs. It will analyze the nature of the underlying activity, beginning with the most 
long-standing ones that are directly re1ated to the vessel's visit to the particular port, 
and proceeding through those which have only recently been considered as condi-
tions for restricting port entry, such as requiring other flag States to cooperate in the 
global war on terrorism. The more traditional, commonly required and obvious the 
condition on port entry, the more likely it will meet standards of international law, 
and also the more likely it will be widely regarded as prudent and necessary. 
After analyzing the question of jurisdiction and the various types of underlying 
activities, we will next consider the nature of the conditions to be imposed, from 
something as unobtrusive as requiring the vessel to notify port authorities of its ar-
rival, to a requirement to provide a list of the names and nationalities of all passen-
gers and crew members, to submitting to an offshore inspection, to outright denial of 
entry to the port. The conditions may extend beyond the immediate visit of the vessel 
to the port State and include activities of the vessel on other occasions, of other ships 
of that shipping company or even of other vessels of that flag State. 
Finally, we will consider a list of relevant questions that a port State and the in-
ternational community should ask with respect to any proposed condition regulat-
ing entry into a port to ensure that it is reasonable and necessary. The questions 
deal with a variety of facto rs, ranging from the importance of the goal the regula-
tory scheme is designed to achieve, to the geographical and temporal nexus be-
tween the vessel and the port State, to the effectiveness of the proposed regulation, 
to the impact of the regulation on freedom of navigation and existing treaty obliga-
tions. The goal of this article is to develop and consider objective criteria to evalu-
ate the legality and wisdom of conditions on port entry. 
III. Conditions on Entry Directly Related to the Vessel's Port Visit 
A. Port Security 
Historically, as well as presently, the most vital single concern that a port State has 
had with respect to oneo r more foreign vessels entering its ports and internal wa-
ters involves its own security. As the United States Supreme Court has expressed it, 
42 
William D. Baumgartner and John T. Oliver 
"[ I]t is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling 
than the security ofthe Nation."s7 As the English, Irish and French lookouts and 
private citizens stared awestruck out to sea in the years around the turn of the first 
millennium, they did not wonder whether the dozen or so longboats manned by 
Viking warriors they observed rowing into their ports or up their rivers were com-
ing to engage in peaceful and productive trade. Instead, they were convinced, based 
on dreadful experience, that these Vikings were hell-bent on raiding their port vil-
lages, pillaging their riches, and abusing and murdering the inhabitants. In short, 
the security of their homeland was in peril. 
For what good it might do, a port or nation obviously has always had the right to 
prohibit the entry of any vessel determined to inflict death and destruction upon it . 
In like manner, the port State could mandate a requirement that the pirate ship or 
foreign-flag raider disarm itselfbefore entering, or sign a promise that no member 
of the crew would engage in any violent or illegal activities while in port. The prob-
lem was that, when faced with marauding Chinese pirates, Phoenician raiders or 
Vikings, the denizens of the beleaguered coastal port usually did not have the re-
sources to insist on anything of the sort. Instead, the security forces and inhabitants 
could only run deep into the forest, row or sail further up the river, or climb the 
nearest mountainside, hoping that the raiders would not find the treasure hidden 
in the well or overtake and murder them as they fled. 
Of course, pirates and other maritime raiders no longer represent a direct threat 
to Los Angeles, Lisbon or Sydney. Nonetheless, in the wake of9/ 11 , national secu-
rity concerns remain paramount throughout the world. Experts conclude that the 
greatest single security risk to America and its allies today is a surreptitious terrorist 
attack on, or by way of, port cities using nuclear weapons.58 To prevent the massive 
nwnber of innocent deaths, physical destruction and financial disruption that this 
would entail,59 a port State may legally do almost anything reasonably necessary to 
protect against such a threat. This article will discuss in detail the various possibili-
ties of how far a port State may go to ensure port security during times of war or to 
protect against actual or potential threats to national security, such as from possi-
ble terrorist attacks.60 Before doing so, however, we will first analyze the traditional 
requirements for port entry properly demanded of bona fide commercial vessels to 
comply with domestic laws to ensure good order and to protect the legitimate in-
terests of the port State. 
B. Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitation and Customs Laws and Regulations 
Beyond seeking to ensure the security of the port State, the most long-standing, 
traditional requirements attendant to a commercial vessel entering a foreign port 
facility are those that pertain to compliance with port State laws involving fiscal, 
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immigration, sanitation and customs (FISC) matters. From the time that the city 
fathers of Venice imposed import taxes on the foreign merchants seeking entry to 
trade their spices or other exotic wares, or the authorities of Tokyo required foreign 
ships to comply with domestic laws related to sanitation, health and immigration, 
coastal States have exacted financial requirements and imposed requirements to 
ensure that their citizens benefited from seaborne trade, rather than suffered ad-
verse consequences. 
All States today agree with the basic principle that a port State may condition a 
foreign ship's entry to port upon compliance with laws and regulations governing 
" the conduct of the business of the port ... provided that these measures comply 
with the principle of equality of treatment" among foreign-flag vessels.61 In the 
United States, Congress has provided for a regulatory scheme related to each FISC-
related requirement, incl uding port clearance and entry procedures,62 payment of 
tonnage and customs duties,6l restrictions on immigration/'"' and sanitation and 
health regulations.65 No one doubts the legal authority for, indeed the necessity of, 
denying entry of a fo reign ship to a port if passengers or members of the crew on 
board carry a serious infectious disease, such as tuberculosis or the plague.66 Like-
wise, a port State may take necessary and effective steps, such as requiring that a local 
public health official first visit the vessel to confirm that the crew and passengers 
are all free of infectious disease, before granting port entry.67 International law 
grants to port States the right to take necessary and appropriate actions to prevent 
the entry into the port of stowaways, absconders, deserters or other illegal immi-
grants.68 Among those is the right to inquire as to nationality, demand to see each 
passport or other identifying document and determine the status and intentions of 
crew members and passengers. 
For many years, each port State established its own paperwork and procedural 
requirements for foreign vessels to complete and submit. As international trade be-
came more universal and essential, the hundreds of different procedural require-
ments and forms became burdensome, particularly where the failure to complete a 
particular document in a particular way caused the responsible b ureaucrat to deny 
or delay port entry, or to delay departure. In some ports, a customs official would 
"overlook" a missing document or "assist" a master in filling out the required 
forms properly in exchange for an under-the-table payment. Even where no bribes 
or other chicanery was involved, the cost, confusion and delay inherent in comply-
ing with varying local laws and completing a plethora of different documents were 
considerable. 
To help ameliorate the problem of burdensome forms and differing port-entry 
requirements, the 1965 London Convention on the Facili tation of International 
Maritime Traffic (FAL) established standard practices with respect to documents 
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and procedures that a port State may require a foreign vessel to submit prior to or 
upon port entrance.69 Because it makes so much practical sense, the international 
community has embraced the Convention .7° In implementing the FAL Conven-
tion to promote maritime efficiency, the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) has developed recommended practices and prepared several standardized 
documents for port States to use.71 Near universal agreement with what a port State 
could impose with respect to fiscal, immigration, sanitation and customs require-
ments, and standard forms and procedures, has greatly improved compliance and 
promoted international trade. While a port State not party to the FAL Convention 
could legally deviate from the IMO FISC-related standards as a condition for port 
entry, to do so would be self-defeating. No State wants to discourage international 
seaborne trade or, without good reason, increase the costs and delays associated 
with it. As a result, virtually all port States, whether or not party to the FAL Con-
vention, use the standardized forms and follow the prescribed procedures. 
C. Navigation. Pilotage and Mooring and Anchorage Requirements 
Port States have also traditionally imposed on visiting vessels the obligation to 
comply with requirements designed to ensure safe navigation within their internal 
waters and the operational efficiency of their ports. AJ; Professors Myres McDougal 
and William Burke observed:12 
Once vessels enter internal waters and are within state territory. states claim sole 
competence to prescribe for activities reJating to the use of the waters. In the port, for 
example. coastal states claim authority to regulate the myriad activities connected with 
port operation such as the movement and anchorage of vessels . .. , assignments of 
berths, and numerous other events directly affecting the use of the area. 
Applicable requirements range from rules mandating use of a pilot-often de-
pending on the size of the vessel, its cargo, horsepower of its plant, and conditions 
of weather or tide-to manning and equipment expectations, to requirements as 
to where the vessel must anchor or moor. To have access to ports, all merchant ves-
sels must follow the rules. 
AJ; a foreign vessel, particularly any large and unwie1dy vessel, approaches the 
busy and restricted internal waters of a port, authorities of the port State usually re-
quire that a pilot boat meet it several miles from restricted waters. From the pilot 
boat emerges an expert mariner, with an intimate knowledge and familiarity about 
the waters, currents, shoals, winds and other peculiarities of the port, and who is 
comfortable in handling a wide range of merchant vessels in any kind of weather, 
tide, traffic, current and light conditions. The United States is one of many port 
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States that condition a foreign vessel's right of entry to its ports upon compliance 
with non-discriminatory pilotage laws and regulations.n In a federal law that 
traces its origins to 1789, pilots and the laws concerning the use of pilots to enter US 
ports are generally governed by applicable state laws, rather than any federally man-
dated requirements.74 The purpose of pilotage laws is to better ensure that a vessel 
can enter and operate within a port safely. The practice of requiring pilots in the 
world's major ports and restricted waterways to ensure the safe entry and depar-
ture oflarger commercial vessels is increasingly common worldwide. For example, 
among other requirements, the People's Republic of China now requires the use of 
licensed pilots for all foreign commercial vessels calling on any of its ports.7S 
Proper port management also requires that port State authorities designate 
when, where, how and under what circumstances a vessel can navigate in inland 
ports and waterways.76 Anyone who has passed through the Panama Canal can at-
test to the scores of merchant ships "waiting their tum" anchored at either the At-
lantic or Pacific side until such time as the local authorities and a qualified pilot are 
ready to take them.17 Managing vessel traffic in the busy, fifty-six-mile-Iong Hous-
ton Ship Channel is nearly as hectic.78 Without some degree of coordination and 
control over vessel operations, the complicated ballet of ships navigating the chan-
nel, anchoring or mooring at the appropriate places, and on-loading and off-loading 
cargoes could not be done safely or efficiently. An obvious permissible condition 
on port entry is a vesse1's willingness to use (and pay for) a qualified pilot and to 
follow the rules of the port and directions from the harbor master and other au-
thorities as to when, where and how to proceed. Failure to comply with these re-
quirements means that the vessel would not be permitted to enter port or, once 
there, would be subject to enforcement jurisdiction. 
D. Ability of the Vessel to Operate Safely 
Another significant goal of the port State is to ensure, as a condition of entry, that 
vessels entering a port will be able to navigate and operate safely.79 Unsafe vessels 
and poorly trained crews present a major threat to the proper operation of a port 
facility and the coastal waters nearby. Those include vessels that are unseaworthy 
because they were not designed or constructed correctly or do not have proper 
equipment; are inadequately maintained; or have an improperly trained, manned 
or certified crew. The Transportation Safety Act includes special precautions that a 
port State may impose with respect to vessels carl)'ing particularly hazardous ma-
terials, such as a cargo of explosives, radioactive materials or liquefied natural gas.so 
Unless the port authorities are convinced that a vessel transporting oil or other 
hazardous materials has the ability to enter port, conduct business there and depart 
the area safely, they are under no obligation to grant access to their internal waters 
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or ports.SI Moreover, a port State has a right to insist, as a condition of entry, that 
the vessel and its crew have demonstrated that they are capable of operating 
safely and have no track record of maritime accidents.82 The 1982 LOS Conven-
tion imposes a "duty to detain" on port States which have determined that a foreign-
flag vessel within one of their ports is in violation of applicable international rules 
and standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens damage to 
the marine environment.83 Finally, a port State may require, as a condition of en-
try, that the vessel is equipped with the latest IMO-approved safety technology to 
avoid collisions and groundings.84 
International commerce would come to a virtual halt if the authorities in each 
port took it upon themselves to impose unique requirements as to how a ship 
should be constructed, equipped, manned, trained and operated. As a result, the 
international community has established detailed rules for most aspects of the 
construction, equipping, operations, manning and training of merchant vessels 
above a certain size. Of all the conventions dealing with maritime safety, the most 
important is the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), as amended.85 The original version was adopted in 1914 in response to 
the sinking of the luxury passenger liner RMS Titanic, and the resulting loss of 
more than fifteen hundred lives.86 The latest version of SOLAS was adopted in 
1974 and has been amended periodically since then. Under SOLAS, classification 
societies carefully swvey (inspect) vessels during and immediately after construc-
tion to ensure compliance with international standards for strength, stabili ty, 
damage control, safety and equipment. Defects must be corrected prior to satisfac-
torily completing the survey. Only then does the classification society issue a cer-
tificate documenting the conditions under which the vessel may safely operate. 
Although flag States have the primary responsibility to ensure ships flying their 
flag are properly documented, port States party to the SOLAS Convention have a 
duty to "intervene" to prevent a vessel from sailing until the owners and crew cor-
rect any unsafe conditions.87 
Another multilateral treaty, the International Omvention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW Convention),88 
seeks to ensure that the vessel's crew members, particularly the master and theves-
sel's other officers. complete rigorous training on engineering. watch standing, 
ship handling. maintenance. rules of the nautical road. firefighting and damage 
control. and other emergency procedures. Only after he or she satisfactorily com-
pletes all aspects of training and demonstrates adequate experience and confi-
dence under instruction is a crew member certified as qualified to serve. A major 
revision of the STCW Convention that the IMO completed in 1995 provides an 
even greater level of precision and standardization. The 1995 Amendments also 
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enhanced port State control, providing a specific right of intelVention and deten-
tion in the case of a collision, grounding or other casualty, or evidence of erratic 
ship handling.89 
These STeW requirements provide qualification standards and expectations 
for seafarers. Ideally, a French master in charge of a supertanker sailing from the 
Persian Gulfto Europe and back will have the same high level of qualifications as a 
South Korean master on a massive container ship sailing to and from Singapore 
and Southern California. Each should be able to safely navigate any vessel in his 
charge through any weather or casualty that might arise. The STCW Convention 
covers many other matters related to maritime safety, induding mandatory crew 
rest and periodic recertification. Under US law, no vessel may enter or operate in 
the navigable waters of the United States unless such vessel complies with all appli-
cable laws and regulations designed to promote maritime safety,90 
From the perspective of the port State, the local authorities have the right to in-
quire whether the vessel's SOLAS certification and documentation are in order, 
and if all the crew have their required and up-to-date STCW certificates, prior to 
allowing the vessel to enter port.91 Ensuring that a port visit will be completed 
safely is an essential port State function, and any requirement reasonably related to 
this goal is permissible as a condition on port entry.92 Ifport State authorities con-
sider it to be essential or helpful to accomplish this purpose, they may direct that 
the visiting vessel submit to a boarding to verify the accuracy of the information 
provided and, in cases of doubt, to physically check the seaworthiness of the vessel 
and qualifications of its crew. Where a pilot is required to be on board, he or she 
may not proceed into port unless the appropriate authorities are confident that the 
vessel is shipshape in every respect. 
The United States Congress recently imposed a safety-related requirement, 
which the Coast Guard has begun to implement, that virtually all commercial ves-
sels operating in US navigable waters carry a properly function ing Automatic Iden-
tification System (AlS).93 "AlS-equipped vessels will transmit and receive 
navigation information such as vessel identification, position, dimensions, type, 
course, speed, navigational status, draft, cargo type, and destination in near real 
time."9.4 AlS can prove essential to avoid collisions and groundings, monitor vessel 
traffic flow, and, as discussed below, help identify and track vessels of interest for 
security purposes as part of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).9S "Once a po-
tential threat has been identified, a port or coastal State must have the capability to 
detect, intercept and interdict it using patrol boats or maritime patrol aircraft. 
Such action could disrupt planned criminal acts and prevent the eventuality of a 
catastrophe before it threatens the port. "96 Other safety-related technology that the 
United States requires of most commercial and certain other vessels calling on US 
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ports includes IMO-approved electronic position-fixing devices,97 automatic radar 
plotting aids98 and emergency communications systems.99 
E. Voyage Information 
Another area of inquiry that port States usually make of vessels calling on their 
ports is that relating to voyage information. One common condition of port entry 
is providing a vessel's Notice of Arrival (NOA), including advance information as 
to the date and time it expects to reach port. Under current US Coast Guard regula-
tions, modified following 9/1 1, visiting ships must generally provide NOA infor-
mation ninety-six hours prior to arrival. lOO The infonnation required in an NOA is 
extensive, including the name of the vessel, flag State, registered owner, operator, 
charterer and classification society.lOl Other voyage information required is the 
names of the last five ports or places visited, dates of arrival and departure, ports 
and places in the United States to be visited, the current location of the vessel, tele-
phone contact information, detailed information on the crew and others on board, 
operational condition of the essential equipment, cargo declaration and the addi-
tional information required under the International Ship and Port Facility Code 
(ISPS Code}.102 
The vessel must make an additional notice whenever there is a hazardous con-
dition, either on board the vessel or caused by the vessel. 103 Failure to do so means 
that the vessel will be denied entry and will have to wait outside of the port until 
the Coast Guard and other port authorities are satisfied that they can safely clear 
the ship.l04 Many of the NOA requirements are related to port security concerns. 
The ninety-six-hour reporting requirement permits Coast Guard and other au-
thorities time to run the vessel through the appropriate au tomated databases to 
try to identify terrorist threats, suspected involvement in drug trafficking or 
trafficking in illegal immigrants, suspicious or hazardous cargo, and any other 
special vulnerabilities. By identifying the current flag State, port State authorities 
can determine whether the fl ag State is party to international procedures to re-
duce the risk of a terrorist attack, whether the vessel in question has been 
prescreened at its previous port of call and whether there is an applicable agree-
ment permitting at-sea searches. The NOA regime also provides adequate time to 
arrange fo r pilotage and tug escorts and plan for the optimal use of limited port 
resources. International law clearly permits port States to require foreign mer-
chant vessels to provide such information directly related to the voyage as a con-
dition of entry, particularly where the IMO has made such requirements 
mandatory for all vessels. !Os 
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IV. Conditions on Entry Related to National Defense, Homeland Security, 
Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Concerns 
A. Vessels from Enemy, Hostile, Unfriendly or Rogue States 
A port State has an absolute right to deny entry to its ports to foreign warships and 
certain other categories of ships it considers threatening.106 Although their sovereign 
status gives warships special immunities from enforcement jurisdiction, a port State 
is within its rights to require prior authorization, deny entry for any cause or no 
cause at all, or condition access, such as limiting the nwnber of warships that may be 
in port at anyone time, or requiring that the vessel enter and leave port only during 
daylight hours. I07 Even where there is an FCN treaty granting to each party reciprocal 
rights to enter each other's ports, the provisions usually exclude routine entry rights 
for "vessels of war. "108 Article 13 of the Statute on the International Regime ofMari-
time Ports specifically excludes its application to warships. 109 The recognition that 
international law gives to port State discretion with respect to providing entry to 
warships is due to the special sovereign immune character of warships, the poten-
tial threat that they might represent to the security of the port State and the lack of 
reciprocal benefits that accrue to the port State when a merchant vessel engages in 
trade. I iO As a general rule, therefore, warships must make special arrangements and 
obtain prior permission before entering a foreign port. III 
The power to deny entry to enemy or potentially hostile vessels is an obvious se-
curity precaution that States have followed for centuries. However, warships are 
not the only vessels to which a port State may deny entry for security reasons. In 
October 2006, the Japanese government barred all ships from North Korea, includ-
ing commercial vessels and scheduled passenger ferries, from entering any of its 
ports due to the "gravest danger" represented by the underground nuclear-weapons 
test in that rogue State. 112 Australia followed suit, banning all North Korean ships 
from entering its ports except in dire emergencies. 1I3 The United States has taken 
even broader action against rogue States. In its most recent Maritime Operational 
Threat Response Plan, which is published as part of the National Strategy for Mari-
time Security, the US government listed six States as non-entrant countries. The six 
presently on the list are Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. 1I4 The 
Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with denying entry to all such vessels "to 
the internal waters and ports of the United States and, when appropriate, to the ter-
ritorial seas of the United States. "liS 
The right to deny port entry in times of actual or perceived threats to national 
security is well established in international law. In the early 1900s, Venezuela 
dosed its ports to the vessels of a single US shipping company during a period of 
revolutionary activity in that nation. The steamship company moo suit before an 
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international arbitral tribunal complaining that the denial of access to Venezuelan 
ports was arbi trary and discriminatory, particularly since those same ports re-
mained open to vessels from other companies. 116 Venezuela claimed that it had de-
nied port entry to that company's vessels to prevent rebel fo rces from receiving 
support and supplies, and that the steamship company in question was the only 
one friendly to the rebels. The umpire found that the prohibition was pennissible, 
opining that " the right to open and close, as a sovereign on its own territory, certain 
harbors, ports or rivers in order to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws is not and 
could not be denied to the Venezuelan Government, much less this right can be de-
nied when used . . . in defense of the existence of the Government."117 
At the same time, US government officials may not act arbitrarily in denying 
port entry, even when based on security concerns. In 1950, President Truman, act-
ing under the authority of the Magnuson Act, 50 US Code sec. 191, issued Execu-
tive Order 10,173, granting to cognizant officials of the US Coast Guard the 
authori ty to deny entry to US ports offoreign-flag vessels, or direct their anchorage 
and movement in US waters, as may be "necessary . . . to prevent damage or injury 
to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters of the United States .... "118 In Cana-
dian Transport Co. v. United States, a Canadian corporation brought action against 
the United States for damages for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit a merchant 
vessel having a Polish master and officers entry to harbor in Norfolk, Virginia, on 
the basis that the presence of Communist bloc officers in that sensitive port might 
pose a risk to national security.ll9 The District Court had entered summary judg-
ment against plaintiff for failure to state a claim. 12o On appeal, however, the D.C. 
Circuit held that "if the Coast Guard officers acted arbitrarily and in violation of 
regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant vessel], the United States is not im-
mune from a damage action .... "121 The Court returned the case to the District 
Court for a factual hearing on that single issue. 
B. Denial of or Restrictions on Entry Related to Terrorism Con cerns 
In recent years, international terrorism has replaced the Cold War and revolution-
ary zeal as the focus of greatest global security concern. Three trends--economic 
globalization, diffusion of nuclear weapons technology and well-funded and fanat-
ical terrorism-present an unprecedented security threat to the United States, its 
trading partners and the whole world.122 Given these trends, port States must do all 
they can to keep foreign merchant ships out of their coastal waters if they represent 
any kind of security risk; the stakes are simply too high.123 According to Dr. Ste-
phen Flynn, the current Jeane 1. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security 
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on the risk terrorists 
pose to international trade, the essence of the terrorist strategy is global economic 
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havoc: "There is a public safety imperative and a powerful economic case for ad-
vancing international trade security."124 Terrorism experts, and the terrorist orga-
nizations themselves, consider seaports to be particularly susceptible to attack.. 12$ 
Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction, and the means to deliver them, dramatically increase the threat. Osama 
bin Laden is reported to have described the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Al-
Qaeda as a "religious duty."126 An improvised nuclear weapon or "dirty bomb" 
hidden in a shipping container, secreted into a port city and then detonated there 
or after it has been loaded on a train or truck and in the transportation network 
could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, hundreds of billions of dollars in de-
struction and incalculable damage to the world's confidence in the global trading 
system. To prevent a terrorist attack by means of a weapon of mass destruction is a 
top priority, within both the United States and the international community.127 
Moreover, traditional containment and deterrence strategies that worked during 
the Cold War are no longer likely to succeed against fanatical terrorist groupS.128 
Appropriate measures to reduce the risk of such an attack include any conditions 
on port entty, or outright denial of such entry, designed to detect and deter terror-
ists; nuclear weapons and other instrumentalities of mass destruction; and other 
weapons, supplies and materials used by terrorists from entering a port State. 
While an attack with a nuclear weapon secreted on a container ship or otherwise 
introduced into the transportation system poses the gravest danger to a port State, 
a terrorist group could cause catastrophic damage using weapons widely available 
to it, such as conventional explosives and rockets. Before 9/11, for example, few 
would have guessed that a small group of committed, suicidal terrorists could have 
caused so much death and destruction by commandeering civilian jetliners and 
crashing them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. 129 Various terrorist cells 
are no doubt speculating even now on vulnerabilities in existing port security plans 
and developing strategems to try to exploit them. 
A port State has the right to deny entry or impose conditions on entry to its ports 
when it determines such action to be necessary to protect the port or coastal State 
and the security of the population against terrorist or other attacks. Indeed, under 
the "vital interests" analysis discussed above, this fundamental principle is self-evi-
dent. Nothing could be more "vital" than defending the homeland against a mas-
sive terrorist attack. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/ 11, the US Congress 
appropriated funds and passed laws, the Department of Homeland Security and 
other cognizant agencies implemented new policies and procedures, and airport, 
border, coastal, and port securi ty has been strengthened considerably. Even so, ex-
perts agree that much more work needs to be done to make our nation's ports and 
borders truly secure and prepared. 13(1 
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There is an additional international legal basis for taking action against poten-
tial terrorist attacks-the fundamental right of self-defense. Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations ... . " While the United Nations originally 
visualized this provision as applying to defending against armed attacks initiated 
by other nation-States, such as Nazi Germany's attack on Poland on September I, 
1939 or the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea in June, 1950, it 
seems perfectly appropriate to extend the right of self-defense to deter attacks by 
subnational terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, in the GWOT. In the United States 
today, the emphasis has changed from enforcing the law and responding to attacks, 
to anticipating and preventing such attacks. III Intemationallaw limits what a nation-
State may do to protect itself against an armed attack by shooting first 132 or taking 
preemptive military measures beyond its own territory.133 However, that paradigm 
may be changing with respect to preemptive action in anticipation ofa terrorist at-
tack. As the White House has argued: 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists ... rely on actsofterror and, potentially, 
the use of weapons of mass destruction .... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by 
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.l14 
In order to better protect the homeland against a terrorist attack, individual 
States and the international community must have adequate means to identify 
and track weapons, vessels, cargo, passengers and crew, and to take appropriate 
action against those that represent a threat. Some of the new programs designed 
to improve coastal and port security against potential terrorist attacks include the 
(I) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), (2) Container Security Initiative (CSl), 
(3) Automated Identification System (AlS), (4) Long-Range Identification and 
Tracking (LRIT) of Ships, (5) International Port Security Program, and (6) other 
initiatives to identify personnel and vessels that pose a security threat to the 
United States and its trading partners and to devise and improve processes to de-
tect and deter them. ns 
One key reason for advancing the requirement of foreign vessels to provide a 
Notice of Arrival at least ninety-six hours before they plan to enter a US port is to 
ensure adequate time to check the accuracy and veracity of the details the vessel has 
provided. l )6 In the United States, watch standers at the National Vessel Movement 
Center (NVMC) monitor the data and evaluate and promulgate possible threats. 137 
However, the decision to approve or disapprove port entry is left to the discretion 
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of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP). u8 Implementing and improving 
processes to identify and track vessels and their cargoes, and to ensure the reliabil-
ity of their crews, will continue to be a key factor in ensuring the security of the 
global transportation network in the United States and around the world. U9 This 
article will now briefly consider several of these initiatives and programs. 
(1) Proliferatiot! Security Initiative 
For many years, the United States and its allies were justifiably concerned about the 
prospect of certain categories of weapons and delivery systems falling into the 
hands of terrorists and rogue States. Various initiatives, including the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically addressed the concern of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Theconcem that outlaw States or inter-
national terrorists could get their hands on weapons of mass destruction intensi-
fied following the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon. President Bush announced the PSI on May 31, 2003, as a "new effort to fight 
proliferation" through international agreements "to search ... ships carrying sus-
pect cargo to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies." I40 The PSI was designed 
to help fill in the gap in international law to ban the secretive and dangerous trade in 
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, other weapons of mass destruction and their de-
livery systems, and component materials. 141 
The impetus to develop the PSI concept was largely due to the circumstances 
surrounding the interdiction of the North Korean freigh ter So Sat! some six hun-
dred miles off the Yemeni coast, which demonstrated the lack of international legal 
tools then available.l4z American satellites and Navy ships had tracked the So Sat! 
following its departure from North Korea in mid-November 2002. Since the vessel 
was not flying a flag and there was intelligence information available that it was car-
tying ballistic missile components to Aden, Spanish naval vessels, in coordination 
with the United States, stopped and boarded the So Sat! on the high seas. 143 The 
crew of the So Sat! contended that the vessel was carrying a legal cargo of concrete 
to Yemen and showed papers demonstrating that it was validly registered in North 
Korea. Nonetheless, the search proceeded and uncovered Scud ballistic missile 
components and chemicals necessary to fuel the missiles hidden beneath the con-
crete. After Yemen demonstrated that the cargo was perfectly legal under a stan-
dard sales and shipping contract, Spanish and American authorities eventually had 
to acquiesce in the vessel continuing on to its destination.144 
There was a general consensus within the Bush Administration, particularly 
within the Department of Defense, that this was an unacceptable result and that 
something had to be done to change existing law and operational procedures to 
permit the interdiction of such shipments. 14S In consultation with other concerned 
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States, President Bush developed and announced the Statement of Imerdiction 
Principles that States participating in PSI are "committed" to undertake. l46 Among 
those steps the Statement lists as appropriate is that the States will stop and search 
suspected vessels, and "enforce conditions on vessels entering o r leaving their 
ports, internal waters, o r territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying 
[prohibited] cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, 
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry." 147 Although the Statement spe-
cifically provides that any actions taken under the PSI will be "consistent with na-
tional legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including 
the United Nations Security Council," some governments and observers are con-
cerned that aspects of the PSI interdiction efforts beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction may violate internationallaw. 148 However, if done with the cooperation 
of the flag State and in compliance with the Statement, interdiction activities 
should not raise any legal problems. Moreover, the United States and its allies 
could use failure of the flag State to cooperate in the PSI as the basis for denying or 
restricting port entry to vessels registered in that State. 
(2) Contai"er Security Initiative 
Another recent initiative to combat the risk of international terrorist attacks on US 
ports is the CSI. 149 The CSt allows US customs agents, in coordination with foreign 
governments, to prescreen high-risk cargo containers at the port of departure. ISO 
Today the CSI process results in the preclearance of some 90 percent of the con-
tainers that enter US seaports and is in place in at least fifty major in ternational sea-
ports around the world. lSI The CSI process consists offour key elements: ( 1) using 
automated infonnation to identify and target high-risk containers; (2) prescreening 
those containers identified as high risk before they leave foreign ports; (3) using 
up-to-date detection technology to quickly and efficiently prescreen high-risk 
containers; and (4) developing and using "smarter," more secure tamper-proof 
containers.ls2 
American citizens and allied nations expect that the United States will adopt 
port entry requirements that are reasonably related to the real threat, effectively de-
signed to respond properly to it, and no more costly or intrusive than reasonably 
necessary. For example, a requirement that every vessel b ringing containers in to a 
US port must wait at a point 200 nautical miles from our shores until the US Coast 
Guard boards the vessel and opens and inspects every container on board would 
not violate internationallaw.ls3 However, given the millions of containers in tran-
sit, the practical impossibility of searching them while on board a vessel under way, 
and the costs and delays that any such effort would entail, this would be an un-
workable and unwise policy. lSo! The CSI, on the o ther hand, focuses on a relatively 
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small number of containers that security experts have determined to be "high risk." 
Trained screening personnel, using the latest high-technology equipment, 
prescreen these "high risk" containers while they are readily accessible, before they 
are loaded on the vessel en route to the next port of call. Among other things, the 
recently enacted Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Act) codi-
fies the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a public-private sector ini-
tiative that offers international shipping companies benefits such as expedited 
clearance through US ports in exchange for improvements in their internal secu-
rity measures. 155 Giving preferential access to vessels from CSI ports is an efficient, 
effective, legal and relatively inexpensive way to lower the threat of international 
terrorism. 
The fourth key element of the CSI process is to use technology to develop and 
employ more secure containers. Perhaps the most promising option is to use the 
latest sensor and computer technology to continually monitor the location, status 
and cargo of each container. A requirement that every container entering the 
United States carry a fully functional, self-contained tamper-resistant embedded 
controller (TREC) would also be a reasonable condition of port entry, particularly 
if industry were to agree to participate voluntarily or if it were part of an IMO vessel 
security initiative. lSI> TREC technology is rapidly being refined and becoming 
widely avaiiable. ls7 Various companies are developing and deploying TRECs that 
use sophisticated operating systems and act as intelligent, real-time tracking de-
vices. These devices are capable of detecting radiation, reporting tampering of the 
container and, when coordinated with shipping plans entered into a computer, 
identifying voyage routing and other anomalies. ISS 
A pilot program is under way to permanently install such controllers on a large 
nwnber of containers. Each unit uses the latest generation of satellite tracking de-
vices and an advanced technology network for use by manufacturers, retailers, lo-
gistics providers, carriers and governments to share real-time cargo information. 
In addition to detecting unauthorized access to the container and providing a con-
stant infonnation stream as to location and status, the TREC controllers have the 
potential to constantly monitor each container's contents to detect the presence of 
radioactive materials and chemical and biological weapons. Any anomaly could 
lead to a denial of port entry until such time as appropriate authori ties could test 
the container offshore or at a safe location. 
Moreover, by enabling them to know exactly where each container is in the 
world at all times, those depending on the shipments and efficient use of the con-
tainers would benefit enormously. For example, imagine that the BMW automo-
bile plant located in Spartanburg, South Carolina is expecting a shipment of 
necessary component parts from Gennany to arrive on August 1. Because of a 
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severe Atlantic hurricane, however, the container ship must delay its arrival by sev-
eral days. In ajust-in-time supply chain, such a delay could cause an expensive halt 
in the assembly line. Knowing of the disruption and to avoid that production delay, 
the factory might order an interim shipment of essential parts to be shipped by air. 
All of this could be done automatically, saving millions of dollars in production de-
lay and unnecessary warehousing. Another key business advantage, particularly to 
the company that owns the shipping container, is that, as soon as the cargo is off-
loaded, it would become immediately available to pick up another shipment. Ex-
cept for the most efficient companies, no one currently keeps track of millions of 
such containers throughout the world. Detecting a weapon of mass destruction 
thousands of miles from the United States, while an absolutely priceless security 
benefit, would be '"' frosting on the cake" to the everyday value of a far more efficient 
global supply system. 
A similar tamper-resistant device could be developed to be permanently affixed 
to each vessel in the world, no matter how small. Ideally, such devices could detect 
the presence of dangerous materials on board or keep track of, and report on, rout-
ing anomalies. If US policymakers were to determine that such devices on contain-
ers or vessels would contribute meaningfully to our maritime security, they could 
require that every vessel entering a US port be equipped with fully functional units 
as a condition of port entry. Global cooperation to develop the best possible tech-
nology, and an international agreement to require the use of such technology on all 
vessels, would be the best approach to the effective implementation of such re-
quirements worldwide. 
Even though the total cost to install a TREe on every container would be signifi-
cant, unit costs would no doubt come down as mass production of the device was 
begun and makers competed for their portion of the market to equip millions of 
containers. Although the international community must expect growing pains as 
the CSI becomes fully operational, initiatives to prevent the "bomb in a box" or 
'"'bomb on board" scenario are important tools to protect homeland security and 
the international transportation network against the threat of paralyzing and ex-
pensive terrorist attacks. 
(3) Automated Identification System 
Modern detection, information and communications technologies provide the 
potential capability to accomplish much of what needs to be done to enhance the 
security of the global maritime transportation system. Although initially introduced 
as a collision avoidance and maritime safety tool, the IMO has recently promoted 
AlS "as a mandatory prescription to the shipping industry's fear of terrorism."15'1 
Although there were growing pains as the technology was developed, AlS has 
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proven to be very helpful, both to mariners and flag and port State authorities. 
Even before the emphasis shifted to combating terrorism, maritime experts had 
identified satellite-based vessel monitoring systems as an invaluable tool fo r man-
aging fishe ries and for promoting maritime safety.l60 The Department of Home-
land Security has statutory authority to implement regulations to fully implement 
AlS in the United States.16 1 The Coast Guard also recognizes the need for such AIS 
information to improve Maritime Domain Awareness by monitoring vessels ap-
proaching the US coastline and, ultimately, to develop the intelligence necessary to 
help deter terrorist attacks on US portS. 162 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002163 and the Coast Guard and 
Maritime Safety Act of 2004 164 required the Coast Guard to develop and imple-
ment a comprehensive vessel identification system . This system will enhance the 
Coast Guard's capabilities to monitor vessels that could pose a threat to the United 
States. 16S AlS is a relatively mature technology, having been a key component of 
IMO's marine safety system for years. All vessels using the Vessel Traffic SelVice 
while entering or leaving major ports in the United States must now employ AlS. 
Consistent with internationally agreed vessel equipment standards, AlS is compul-
sory on all large commercial vessels worldwide. Moreover, US law and regulations 
require that it be operational on larger vessels entering US waters. l66 The United 
States and its trading partners may further exploit AlS to keep track of vessels, with 
satellite AIS tracking on the near-term horiwn. 167 
(4) Long-Range Identification and Tracking o!Ships 
The Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships system is another IMO initia-
tive under SOLAS.lMWhen it becomes fully operational in January 2009, LRIT will 
require ships to which the requirement applies (passenger ships, cargo ships over 300 
gross tons, including high-speed craft, and mobile offshore drilling units on interna-
tional voyages) to transmit their identities, locations, and dates and times of their po-
sitions. 169 That information may be accessed upon payment of the costs thereofby 
port States for those ships that intend to enter ports of that State. Most signifi-
cantly, coastal States may obtain access to the information when the ship is a desig-
nated distance off that State's coast, not to exceed one thousand nautical miles. 170 
As it is presently planned, there will be no interface between LRIT and AIS. One 
of the more important distinctions between LRIT and AlS, apart from the obvi-
ous one of range, is that, whereas AIS is a broadcast system available to all within 
range, data derived through LRlT will be available only to the SOLAS contracting-
government recipients who are enti tled to receive such information. As a result, 
the LRIT regulatory provisions have built-in safeguards to ensure the confidential-
ity of the data and prevent unauthorized disdosure or access. LRIT will be another 
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tool to keep track of vessels that might represent a security threat. Traditional free-
dom of navigation principles prevent a coastal State from requiring AlS or LRIT 
information on foreign-flag vessels merely navigating on the high seas or within 
the exclusive economic zone, or engaged in innocent or transit passage through the 
territorial sea. However, by adopting the AlS and LRIT amendments to SOLAS, 
contracting governments may obtain available AIS and LRIT information from 
other contracting States. Vessels from States that choose not to participate may be 
subject to extra scrutiny and delay, additional port access screening or reporting re-
quirements, or even outright denial of entry to ports. 
(5) International Port Security Program 
In December 2002, the IMO adopted a new set of rules for all States and interna-
tional shipping companies. 171 These rules included changes to the Safety of Life at 
Sea Convention through adoption of the ISPS Code. These came into effect on July 
1, 2004. The ISPS Code requires States to assess the security risks at all port facilities 
and to ensure that port operators prepare and implement security plans. Shipping 
companies have to evaluate risks to their vessels and develop prevention and re-
sponse plans. Moreover, ISPS requires that ships install AlS, develop ship securi ty 
alert systems, create a permanent display of their vessel identification numbers and 
carry a valid International Ship Security Certificate. Assuming that vessels comply 
with the ISPS requirements, port States may not take enforcement action against 
the vessel, including denial of port entry, unless there are "clear grounds" for con-
cluding that a vessel represents a security threat to the port State. Even then, inter-
national procedures encourage the port State to provide an opportunity for the 
vessel to rectify the non-compliance. 
Under US law, the Coast Guard is responsible fo r determining whether foreign 
ports are maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures. 172 To do this, the Coast 
Guard created the International Port Security Program. It generally uses a State's 
implementation of the ISPS Code as the key indicator as to whether it has effective 
anti-terrorism measures in place.173 When the Coast Guard determines that a for-
eign port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures (normally by its 
failure to fully implement the ISPS Code), the Coast Guard imposes conditions of 
entry on vessels arriving in the United States from a port of that State. These con-
ditions of entry usually require that the vessel take additional security measures, 
both while in the foreign port and in the United States, to rectify the apparent 
non-compliance. In addition, the Coast Guard will issue a port security advisory 
concerning that port and publishes a notice in the Federal Register to provide 
public notice of its determination. Should a vessel not meet those conditions or 
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should there be additional "dear grounds" for concern, the vessel may be denied 
entry into the United States. 
Before allowing it to enter its first US port of call, the Coast Guard must board 
and inspect each high-interest vessel before it enters the territorial sea or, depend-
ing on local conditions, shortly thereafter. Before the Captain of the Port will per-
mit the vessel to enter the US port, the inspection team must first determine that 
the vessel has complied with special security conditions in the foreign port(s), con-
duct an inspection using radiation-monitoring equipment and impose certain ad-
ditional security requirements. 17~ If the vessel is unwilling to subject itself to any of 
these conditions or the inspection fails to resolve any security concerns, the COTP 
has the authority to impose various "control and compliance measures," induding 
denial of entry to the port.175 Presently, the Coast Guard requires that foreign-flag 
vessels list the five previous foreign ports on which they have called. 176 Since any 
such measures would be designed to effectively reduce the risk of a terrorist attack 
on a US port, imposing such non-discriminatory conditions on port entry com-
ports with international law. Vessels that meet the requirements of the ISPS Code 
and have called upon ports that are in compliance with the ISPS Code generally will 
not be considered to be of "high interest" and will not typically be required to un-
dergo inspections beyond the US territorial sea. 
The effect of the ISPS Code and efforts to implement it around the world means 
that today the IMO, the United States and the rest of the international shipping com-
munity has a much better handle than ever before on where all commercial vessels 
are at anyone time, the nature of the potential security threat, how to avoid a terror-
ist incident and how best to respond to various other emergency situations. 
(6) Other Programs Designed to Improve Vessel and Port Security 
At the IMQ, within the US government, and in various international fora, respon-
sible policy experts are engaged in an ongoing effort to review and improve pro-
grams designed to enhance the security of commercial vessels and ports. Time and 
space does not permit a comprehensive review of all the various proposals. Suffice 
it to note here that whatever international agreements the international community 
develops to improve security against potential terrorist attacks m ust include appro-
priate legal and policy bases on which to impose conditions on entry into port. 
C. Denial of or Restrictions on Entry Related to Suspected Criminal Activity 
States have a right to require that vessels seeking to call on their ports will comply 
with relevant criminal laws and regulations designed to protect the peace and secu-
ri ty of the port State. Port State authorities may deny entry to, or impose extensive 
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controls on, commercial vessels seeking access to their ports as they may deem nec-
essary to ensure that any such vessels are not promoting criminal activities. 
There is a vast array of potential criminal activities that can be promoted 
through port entry, ranging from the importation of illegal drugs, trafficking in 
women and children for various criminal purposes, maritime terrorism, illegal im-
migration, and other violations of customs and immigration laws and regulations. 
To combat such illegal activities, States may require vessels visiting their ports to 
submit to law enforcement boardings and investigatory screenings. Moreover, if 
flag States, particularly "open registry" or "flags of convenience" States, are unwill-
ing to take appropriate action to ensure that vessels that they have registered are 
not engaged in criminal enterprises, a port State could appropriately deny entry to 
vessels from such States. 177 All States naturally see effective crime prevention as a 
vital State interest that justifies appropriate investigation and exercise of the sover-
eign right to close or protect access to their ports. 
If a State is aware that a particular vessel, the vessels of a particular company, or 
the vessels operating under the flag of a particular State are engaged or likely to be 
engaged in criminal activity, that State's port authori ties may deny entry to that 
vessel or that group ofvessels. 178 Likewise, these authorities may require that those 
vessels submit to a records review, a thorough search, and/or other personnel or 
cargo screening as a precondition for entry. To increase security in the transporta-
tion industry, the US Congress established a requirement that all "crewmembers on 
vessels calling at United States ports .. . carry and present on demand any identifica-
tion that the Secretary decides is necessary. "179 This has evolved into the Department 
of Homeland Security's initiative to establish a transportation workers identifica-
tion credential (TWIC) for workers in the maritime industry. ISO In the SAFE Port 
Act of 2006, Congress directed that persons convicted of certain crimes could not 
obtain a TWIC, and that the TWIC process be in place at the ten most vulnerable 
US ports by July 1,2007, and that the process be in place for the forty most vulnerable 
ports by July 1, 2008. lSI The benefits of requiring and screening lists of crew and pas-
sengers in an NOA include the opportunity to detect those with criminal records. All 
of these conditions on entry are well established in traditional State practice. 182 
D. Balancing the Right of Port Entry in Emergency Cases of Force Majeure or 
Distress with the Protection of the Vital Interest of the Port 
There is one set of circumstances where customary international law generally rec-
ognizes a vessel's right to enter any port-where the ship is in distress due to force 
majeure. IS3 Historically, a vessel in distress due to bad weather conditions, danger-
ous sea state, involvement in a collision, fire or other emergency condition threat-
ening the loss of the vessel and the lives of those on board enjoyed a right to seek 
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refuge in a foreign port, bay or other protected internal waters of a foreign coastal 
State.lSo! The 1982 LOS Convention recognizes the principles of force majeure and 
distress as permitting a ship to stop and anchor when in innocent or transit pas-
sage. ISS Moreover, both coastal States and individual mariners have an obligation 
to take affirmative action to render assistance to vessels and persons "in danger of 
being lost at sea."I66 
As a general rule, vessels in distress have a right of entry into the internal waters 
of a port State to seek shelter without first obtaining permission from that State, es-
pecially when there is the real risk that the vessel might be lost, thus putting the 
lives of those on board at genuine risk. 187 Moreover, the sovereign authority of the 
port State does not generally apply to vessels forced to seek refuge in a port by force 
majeure or other necessity, except as may be necessaty to ensure the safe and effi-
cient operation of the port. ISS Under long-standing principles of customaty inter-
national law, therefore, when a vessel is in extremis and must take shelter in a safe 
harbor, the port State may not exclude the vessel fro m its internal waters and may 
"not take advantage of the ship's necessity" in any way.IS9 
On the other hand, port States have a right to protect themselves and their citi-
zens under the principle of self-preservation. This basic principle gives such States 
the right, indeed the fundamental responsibility, to keep dangerous instrumentali-
ties and conditions away.l90 As Professors McDougal and Burke expressed it: "[ IJf 
the entty of the vessel in distress would threaten the health and safety . .. of the port 
and its populace, exclusion may still be permissible."191 The Netherlands Judicial 
Division of the Council of State recently considered the conditions under which a 
badly damaged Chinese vessel had a right to enter Dutch waters for the purpose of 
effecting repairs in a shipyard: l92 
[Ul nder international law [a Statel may not go so far as to prevent a ship which is in 
distress and requires repairs from entering territorial and coastal waters and seeking 
safety in a port or elsewhere along the coast. In such case, the seriousness of the 
situation in which the ship finds itself should be weighed against the threat which the 
ship poses to the coastal State. 
Thus, the right to seek refuge does not extend to situations in which greater dam-
age or loss ofHfe may result were the vessel to enter. The port State must balance 
the emergency on the vessel with the threat to its own people and nation. Given the 
national security sensitivities in the world today, it seems unlikely that any vessel in 
distress today can demand entty to any port at any time. Instead, port State author-
ities may well conclude, based on all the relevant factors, that permitting a vessel 
entry into its port or internal waters represents an unacceptable threat to vital port 
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State interests, and take all necessary action to bar entry. However, the doctrine of 
force majeure continues to represent a viable basis for requesting such access and, in 
most cases, fully expecting to find safe refuge. Moreover, if port State authorities 
deny or condition entry, they should be able to articulate a defensible basis for do-
ing so. Finally, if the port State denies entry, that State's authorities, and the mas-
ters of any vessels in a position to assist, must provide appropriate aid to preselVe 
the lives of any mariners or other persons in distress. m 
V. Domestic A uthority and Practical Procedures for Denying Port Entry 
Even if a port State has the international legal right to deny entry to its ports to a 
particular vessel in the interests of maritime security, the cognizant officials must 
usually have explicit domestic authority to do so. While a country's head of State or 
legislative body could fonnally advise another State that vessels flying its flag are 
not welcome within its ports (such as Japan and Australia have recently done with 
respect to vessels flying the North Korean flag and the international community is 
doing to enforce UN sanctions against Iran), most decisions are made by lower-
level functionaries seeking to apply domestic law designed to promote the interests 
of the State. Since there is a general presumption of entry for foreign-flag commer-
cial vessels, an official who determines that a vessel may not enter under certain cir-
cumstances must generally have the domestic legal authority to do so. Otherwise, 
that official and his agency may experience legal and political complications for en-
gaging in an ultra vires act or failing to follow mandated procedures. This might 
even result in a lawsuit and/or political or diplomatic pressures if the responsible 
official has taken unauthorized or illegal action to the detriment of the fore ign-flag 
shipping company and the domestic interests using that vessel to engage in inter-
national trade. In other words, even if a State has the international legal right to 
prevent entry, the exercise of that right must be carried out in accordance with do-
mestic legal authority and following established procedures. 
In the handful of reported decisions that have focused on the denial of port en-
try in the United States, the aggrieved party has generally taken the position that 
the officials who have made the decision to do so have acted contrary to domestic 
law and policy. In Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, for example, a Canadian 
corporation brought an action for damages for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit 
a vessel employing a Polish master and several Polish officers entry to the harbor in 
Norfolk, Virginia. 194 The appellate court obselVed that "if the Coast Guard officers 
acted arbitrarily and in violation of regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant 
vessel], the United States is not immune from a damage action ... . "19S 
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In a more recent case, Humane Society of the United States v. Clinton,l96 plaintiffs 
successfully sued President Clinton and the Secretary of Commerce because of the 
federal government's failure to take timely action to sanction Italian driftnet fish-
ing vessels when these government officials had, or should have had, reasonable 
cause to believe that such vessels persisted in employing excessively long driftnets 
in violation of an international treaty and the implementing statute,l 9"7 The US 
Court of International Trade concluded that "nine confirmed sightings [of illegal 
driftnet fishing by Italian vessels] combined with the numerous allegations make 
the Secretary's refusal to identify Italy a second time arbitrary, capricious and not 
in accordance with the Driftnet Act."198 
Existing federal statutes and regulations give the Coast Guard rather broad 
power to deny port entry and control operations within US waters offoreign-flag 
vessels found to be in violation oflaws, regulations or treaties to which the United 
States is a party. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended,l99 spe-
cifically authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security (delegated to the cognizant 
Coast Guard District Commander and COTP) to deny port entry to any US port or 
navigable waters if"he has reasonable cause to believe such vessel does not comply 
with any regulation issued under this chapter or any other applicable law or 
treaty."200 Implementing regulations provide that "[e]ach District Commander or 
Captain of the Port . .. may deny entry into the navigable waters of the United 
States ... to any vessel not in compliance with the provisions of the [Act] or the reg-
ulations issued thereunder."201 Later in that regulation, the District Commander 
or COTP is given authority to order a vessel to operate in a particular manner 
whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe that the vessel is not in compliance 
with any regulation, law or treaty . ... "202 
When a port State has good cause to deny port entry to a foreign- flag vessel and 
decides to do so, it has an obligation to notify the vessel's master, its flag State and 
its owner(s) in as timely a manner as is reasonable under the circumstances. The 
President, Secretary of State, appropriate US ambassador or other authorized State 
Department official could communicate to the appropriate flag State that a partic-
ular vessel may not call upon ports in the United States because of its violation of an 
international convention or domestic law. However, under existing US proce-
dures, appropriate Coast Guard officials normally carry out the process of denying 
port entry to a fo reign-flag vessel where US laws and regulations require or autho-
rize it. The cognizant District Commander or COTP normally issues an order to 
the vessel denying port entry. Such an order should include a summary of the fac-
tual situation, the basis for denying port entry, the legal authority for taking such 
action, the circumstances under which the order would be rescinded, the potential 
penalties for violating the order, the process fo r appealing the order and the office 
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which the recipient of the order could call for any questions. Such an order should 
be communicated not only to the vessel in question, but also to its owners, agents 
and fl ag State. 
Anytime that the United States seeks to deny port entry to a foreign-flag vessel, 
even to a foreign warship, fishing vessel or merchant vessel that is in dear violation 
of a law, regulation or treaty obligation, it must find the authority for denying such 
entry and comply with basic due process requirements of notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. Particularly involving issues related to homeland security, the 
Coast Guard and other cognizant agencies employ the Maritime Operational 
Threat Response (MOTR) coordination process to effectively align and integrate 
"responses to real or potential terrorist incidents across all stakeholders" in the fed-
eral government.203 If Congress and cognizant agencies consider that denial of port 
entry to certain foreign-flag vessels under particular circumstances promotes key 
interests of the United States, there should be laws, regulations and procedures in 
place to carry out such a policy. Otherwise there are likely to be legal, political and 
practical consequences for the denial. 
VI. Evaluation and Development of an Analytical Matrix 
One of the key purposes of this paper is to develop a methodology to evaluate pro-
posed and actual conditions that the United States and other port States seek to im-
pose on foreign-flag vessels to promote maritime security. This section will 
evaluate both the legal and policy factors that affect the imposition of such condi-
tions and then propose an analytical methodology in determining whether a par-
ticular condition on port entry is an appropriate way to promote a particular policy 
goal. The final part of this section will emphasize the need and importance ofhar-
monizing port State regulations with international expectations and procedures. 
A. Evaluating Legality and Policy for Imposing Port Entry Conditions 
As discussed in detail above, international law permits port States to impose rea-
sonable conditions on the entry of foreign vessels into ports. Promoting mari-
time security is dearly a reasonable, if not essential, policy goal. However, the 
international community presumes that, as a general rule, commercial vessels will 
have access to the ports into which they need to enter to engage in global trade. To 
be consistent with international law, any conditions on port entry must be based 
on important national goals, must be directly and effectively related to accomplish-
ing one or more of these goals and must be objectively prudent and necessary un-
der all the circumstances. Any effort to impose conditions on port entry of a 
foreign-flag vessel involves a claim of jurisdiction over the vessel for certain 
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purposes. A port State may not deny entry or exercise jurisdiction with respect to a 
foreign-flag vessel or its activity when the exercise of such jurisdiction would be arbi-
trary. discriminatory. unreasonable. in violation of treaty obligations or otherwise 
improper.2Cl4 
B. Determina tion of "Reasonableness" 
Although individual States. the international community and legal commentators may 
often differ as to when the imposition of conditions or the exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable under various circwnstances. it is important to make an effort to dctennine 
whether the imposition of such restrictions would be reasonable. In detennining 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a vessel or its activity as a condition of port en-
try is appropriate or not involves consideration of a number of relevant factors. Ques-
tions that a port State and the international community might appropriately ask in 
determining the reasonableness of a law or regulation conditioning port entry or im-
posing jurisdiction upon a vessel's arrival in port include: 
(1) Is the policy interest(s) that the law or regulation is designed to address 
one of significant importance to the port State? 
(2) Does the harm(s) to be avoided. or the benefit(s) to be achieved. have a 
direct connection to the fore ign vessel's presence while operating in the 
coastal waters of the port State? 
(3) Does the regulated activity have a close geographical and temporal nexus 
to the entry of the vessel into the waters of the port State? 
(4) Will the law or regulation be effective in accomplishing the policy goal(s) 
for which it was implemented? 
(5) Would the exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances violate an 
applicable bilateral or multilateral convention or the relevant provisions 
of customary international law? 
(6) Will the law or regulation have the practicaJ effect of denying or 
impeding freedom of navigation in international waters. or the exercise 
of the rights of innocent passage. transit passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage. as provided in the 1982 LOS Convention? 
(7) Is there domestic legal authority for denying port entry, and have the 
appropriate authorities complied with the procedural requirements to 
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notify the vessel of the denial and included an opportunity to be heard on 
the matter? 
(8) Is there a less intrusive, disruptive, expensive, complicated or 
objectionable way to accomplish the same policy goal(s)? 
Each of these questions is relevant in determining the reasonableness of the law or 
regulation under consideration. States considering whether or not to enact such 
laws or impose such regulations should evaluate them to ensure they are objec-
tively reasonable. 
C. Harmonizing Regulations with International Law and Expectations 
Even where the port State can demonstrate that the proposed regulation is impor-
tant and that, under the factors discussed above, it is objectively reasonable, it is 
important to harmonize the proposed regulation with relevant international stan-
dards and expectations. The best way to accomplish this is to obtain the approval of 
the "competent international organization" charged with regulating the particular 
activity. If a port State wanted to establish a traffic separation scheme for vessels en-
gaged in innocent passage through its territorial sea on the way into internal wa-
ters, international law requires that it take into account "the recommendations of 
the competent international organization. "205 Before establishing such schemes 
within international straits used for international navigation, the 1982 LOS Con-
vention requires that the "States bordering the straits shall refer proposals to the 
competent international organization with a view to their adoption. "206 Within the 
exclusive economic zone, a coastal State may "adopt laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and 
giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards .... "207 Based 
on comity and efficiency, all States should seek to harmonize their national expec-
tations, standards and procedures with those of the international community. 
The 1982 LOS Convention provides for coordinating proposals that affect inter-
national shipping, particularly with respect to navigational safety and the protec-
tion of the marine environment, within the IMO process. The IMO has proven 
particularly adept at reaching consensus, and then harmonizing national and in-
ternational standards and expectations for a wide variety of issues ranging from 
vessel construction through bilge-water-discharge standards. The 1965 Conven-
tion on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, which the IMO has updated 
regularly, emphasizes the importance of simplifying and reducing to a minimum 
the administrative burdens imposed on international shipping "to facilitate and 
expedite international maritime traffic .... "2(18 
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Any measures designed to protect port State interest must also be instituted in 
such a way so as to avoid the practical effect of denying or impeding freedom of 
navigation as provided in the 1982 LOS Convention. Those interested in the law of 
the sea m ust be concerned about the potential impact that restrictions on port en-
try might have on vessels merely engaged in transit passage, innocent passage or 
high seas navigation in the exclusive economic zone of another State. Some of the 
restrictions on port entry under consideration by some port States, such as Austra-
lia's recent decision to require pilots on most vessels transiting the Torres Strait, 
threaten traditional navigational freedoms and undermine long-standing princi-
ples of the law of the sea.209 Others are less objectionable, because they bind only 
State parties. These include a provision of the recently adopted Wreck Removal 
Convention, which imposes a requirement that each State party shall ensure that 
any ship entering or leaving a port or offshore terminal provide evidence of finan-
cial security.2l0 Another trend in multilateral treaties is to require that States party 
bar entry to their ports for fishing vessels determined to have been engaged in ille-
gal, unregulated and unreported fishing activities. Another issue that requires con-
sideration is the possible impact of conditions on entry with trade agreements. 
Since World War II, multilateral efforts have sought to reduce barriers to interna-
tional trade, while ensuring a level playing field. These efforts first resulted in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT). During the 1990s, negotiations 
led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO ), which took over 
most of the functions ofGATI. Although the WTO/GATT process is silent on the 
specific issue of vessel access to ports, the denial of a right of port entry could well 
be seen as a trade barrier inconsistent with a nation's responsibility under its provi-
sions. Moreover, if a port State were to treat vessels flying various foreign flags dif-
ferently, the wrO/GATI rules may apply to prevent discrimination or favorab le 
treatment being given to vessels from member States.211 However, in practice, 
there is little real danger of a successful challenge when the port State is seeking to 
promote legitimate concerns, such as environmental protection, vessel safety and 
homeland security. As Professor Ted Dorman put it, 
While the international trade agreements administered by the W.T.O. may affect the 
ability of a port state to deny access to foreign vessels or to impose burdensome 
conditions on foreign vessels entering port, the effect is limited to those situations 
where the port state is using port access as a means to deny entry of the goods being 
carried by the vessel. 212 
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As discussed earlier in this article, any regulations designed to restrict entry to US 
ports must also be consistent with our international obligations under any bilateral 
FeN treaties to which the US is party. 
VII. Recommendations and Conclusion 
For the good of the entire world community, policymakers must seek to ensure 
that ocean trade contin ues to flourish and grow. This requires promoting access to 
key ports with minimal restrictions and conditions. Toward this end, international 
law presumes that the ports of every port State should be open to all foreign com-
mercial vessels, and a port may be closed or a vessel denied entry to the port only 
when important interests of the port State justify the closure. 
At the same time, the world community must be sensitive to the legitimate con-
cerns of port States to protect important national interests, particu1arly maritime 
safety and securi ty. To promote and protect these and other important interests, 
port States have a right to close their ports or to impose conditions on port entry 
and exit with respect to a broad range of important interests directly related to the 
vessel's visit. A port State may restrict entry to all foreign vessels, subject only to any 
rights of entry clearly granted under an applicable treaty and those vessels in dis-
tress due to force majeure. 
To avoid using international trade as a heavy-handed and ineffective diplomatic 
tool designed to reward or punish foreign States, however, a port State should not 
impose port entry or exit requirements on foreign merchant vessels--or exercise ju-
risdiction on foreign-flag vessels in port--even those designed to promote impor-
tant goals, that are not reasonably related to the visit of the vessel in question on the 
specific occasion. Toward this end, absent specific, identifiable concerns with re-
spect to the vessel or State in question, a port State shou1d treat all foreign-flag ves-
sels equally, and not discriminate in the prescription and enforcement of its laws. 
The application of the law of the port State should not have the practical effect of 
denying or impairing the traditional rights of the sea, including freedom of naviga-
tion in international waters, or the exercise of the rights of innocent passage, transit 
passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, in coastal waters. Moreover, denial of 
port entry, or imposing unreasonable conditions on port entry, has an adverse im-
pact on the port State's abili ty to engage in international trade. As a result, such re-
strictions harm the economy of both the port State and, to a less direct extent, the 
world community at large. 
Given the crucial importance of international trade in today's global economy, 
incremental costs, short delays or minor disruptions can have a profoundly adverse 
impact. In this regard, harmonizing and coordinating conditions on port entry 
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throughout the world community, with similar expectations, requirements, forms 
and procedures, can achieve the goals without imposing as much of an administra-
tive burden. Wisely balancing the benefits to be achieved from imposing condi-
tions on port entry, such as intelligently devised securi ty requirements, against the 
costs and burdens associated with each, is essential. International lawyers and pol-
icymakers m ust strive to ensure that access to the world's ports is as free as reason-
ably possible, and that conditions on entry and exit are directly and effectively 
related to the important interests of the port State and the world community at 
large. The goal of all States should be to promote and ensure safe, secure, efficient 
and environmentally sound international ocean trade. 
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